Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 111

2012

What Can the Brothers Malone Teach Us About
Ficher v. University of Texas?
Charlie Gerstein
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Race
Commons
Recommended Citation
Charlie Gerstein, What Can the Brothers Malone Teach Us About Ficher v. University of Texas?, 111 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions
97 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol111/iss1/1

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

WHAT CAN THE BROTHERS MALONE TEACH
US ABOUT FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS?
Charlie Gerstein*
Introduction
In 1975, the Brothers Malone took the entrance exam for the Boston
Fire Department. At the time, the Department was under a court-ordered
affirmative action plan: it divided its pool of test-takers into groups of black
and white applicants and gave substantial preference to those in the former.
The Brothers listed themselves as white and didn’t make the cut.1
In 1977, the Brothers Malone again took the entrance exam for the Boston Fire department, this time listing themselves as black. The Brothers
became firemen. Within a few years, someone at the Fire Department grew
suspicious of the Malones. An investigation ensued. The Department determined that the Brothers had falsified their applications. Eventually a Suffolk
County Judge was forced to decide whether the Malones were black or
white.2 Judge Herbert Wilkins sought three kinds of evidence to make his
determination.
[T]he Malones might have supported their claim to be Black[:] (1) by visual observation of their features; (2) by appropriate documentary evidence,
such as birth certificates, establishing Black ancestry; or (3) by evidence
that they or their families hold themselves out to be Black and are considered to be Black in the community.

He found the Brothers Malone to be white. They had “fair skin, fair hair
coloring and Caucasian facial features.” The Malones’ birth certificates and
their parents’ birth certificates show that the Malone family had been reported “consistently as white for three generations.” Finally, “there was no
evidence that the Malones identified themselves personally or socially as
Blacks.”3 By the time Judge Wilkins ruled, eleven Boston firefighters were
under investigation for allegedly fibbing about their race.4
Does this episode trouble you? Are you uncomfortable with a judge taking a look at a pair of brothers and saying “they’re white?” Or with a judge
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Aaron
Nathan, Emmy Parsons, Molly Alarcon, and Kate Gilbert, without whom this Essay would be
a crumpled piece of paper in my trashcan. I would also like to thank Professor Nicholas Bagley for his thorough and helpful comments.
1. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in RaceConscious Law, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1231, 1232 (1994).
2. Id. at 1233 (quoting Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Suffolk
Cnty. July 25, 1989)).
3. Id.
4. Peggy Hernandez, Firemen Who Claimed To Be Black Lose Appeal, Boston
Globe, July 26, 1989, at 13–14.
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and declaring that they don’t “socially [identify]” as black? If so, rest easy:
this is the only such instance to be readily found in legal databases. While
race remains a factor of legal significance in several contexts, courts avoid
adjudicating litigants’ race.
This Essay argues that squeamishness about deciding people’s race can
explain some otherwise baffling trends in affirmative action jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court’s fear of letting government agencies decide, as a factual matter, the race of individual students may explain its odd and seemingly
inconsistent reluctance to use race as a factor in admissions. Part I discusses
various legal strategies for adjudicating race and why we may be uncomfortable with them. Part II argues that Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v.
Bollinger can be explained through the lens of the Malones, using the Fifth
Circuit’s reading in Fisher v. The University of Texas, the challenge to Texas’s affirmative action program heading to the Supreme Court this term. Part
III proposes a new reading of Grutter—arguing that Grutter serves to protect a school’s right to select students on nonracial grounds—and suggests
some implications for the program at issue in Fisher.
I. Discomfort with Adjudicating Race
Race seems fundamentally impossible to adjudicate in a satisfying manner. Professor Christopher Ford outlines several possibilities for race
adjudication, drawing examples of classificatory systems from apartheid
South Africa, caste-system India and the Jim Crow South. All of these
schemes can be divided into two basic, self-explanatory possibilities: “selfascribed” and “other-ascribed” identifications.5 The former invite the unscrupulous to deceive; the latter seem counter to our basic notions of selfdescription and self-determination. Apartheid South Africa comes closest to
what Ford calls “racial due process,” with hearings, appeals, and extensive
evidentiary proceedings available to contest a legally binding racial determination.
Consider next the intricacies of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s “spot checks” of employer-reported minority statistics; they
are, to say the least, unlikely to be accurate. Without delving too deeply into
the issue, it suffices to note that the Commission discourages the use of selfreported statistics because of their tendency to invade employees’ privacy.
Instead, the Commission’s guidelines encourage employers trying to disprove allegations of underutilizing minority workers to conduct a “visual
survey” of their employees. The employers are then encouraged to report the
racial composition of their workforces. Indeed, the foxes are running the
henhouses.
Government adjudication of race may also conjure a deeply unpleasant
image in our collective memory.6 Indeed, in an era of anti-miscegenation
5. Ford, supra note 1, at 1267.
6. See Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember 1 (1989) (discussing the characteristics and formation of collective memory).
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laws and de jure segregation, American states needed ways to decide who
belonged to which racial group. And each state had one. Virginia entrusted
racial determinations to bureaucratic agents.7 In 1944, the state codified its
bureaucratic system, including a provision for what to do when the Registrar
of Vital Statistics feared someone’s race was “incorrect.”8 If the court clerk
was, say, about to issue a marriage license but then found “reasonable cause
to disbelieve” the bride or groom’s race, the clerk was to withhold the license until “satisfactory proof” was provided.9 The punishment for a “false”
racial self-identification was a year in prison.10 Missouri, for its part, had
juries determine the racial status of individual litigants.11 Each state provided a definition of who counted as black. Ohio defined someone as black if
she had “any distinct and visual admixture of African blood.”12 Georgia
characterized as black “all negroes, mulattoes, mestizos and their descendants, having any ascertainable trace of Negro or African, West Indian or AsiAsiatic Indian blood in their veins.”13 Does this seem meaningfully different
from what Judge Wilkins did?
Are you uncomfortable now?
II. Reluctance to Define Race Explains the
Distinction in GRATZ and GRUTTER
Much ink has been spilled about the “split double-header”14 of Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.15 In those opinions, the Supreme Court
drew a distinction between the affirmative action programs at issue—one
that may be difficult to justify or understand at first; but it can be explained
by the Court’s squeamishness about race.
The distinction these cases concoct baffles many first-year constitutional
law students. Post-Gratz and Grutter, a school may constitutionally use race
as an explicit bonus in an admissions process that holistically reviews each
application for the purpose of establishing a critical mass of minority students (with the size of a critical mass differing for different minorities), but
it may not assign specific point values to minority status, even in an other7. Ford, supra note 1, at 1275.
8. Id. (citing Act of February 22, 1944, ch. 52, 1944 Va. Acts 51, 54).
9. Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to
Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 421, 436 (1988) (quoting An Act to Preserve Racial
Integrity, 1924 Va. Acts 534).
10. An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, 1924 Va. Acts 534, available at
http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/encounter/projects/monacans/Contemporary_Monacans/racial.
html.
11. Ford, supra note 1, at 1275–76.
12. David H. Fowler, Northern Attitudes Towards Interracial Marriage:
Legislation and Public Opinion in the Middle Atlantic and the States of the Old
Northwest, 1780–1930, at 201 (1987).
13. Id. at 362.
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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wise similarly holistic admissions process. In essence, these cases hold that
race is only an acceptable factor in admissions when it is interpreted in light
of an applicant’s broader life experience. Regardless of one’s opinion on the
merits of either case, the distinction may seem silly at best and purposefully
disingenuous at worst. “If honesty is the best policy,” Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent in Gratz, “surely Michigan’s accurately described,
fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”16
The Fifth Circuit in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin has taken the
holdings of Gratz and Grutter to their natural conclusion, effectively writing
race out of the college admissions calculus.17 In Fisher, the appellate court
noted that “it would be difficult for UT to construct an admissions policy
that more closely resembles the policy approved by the Supreme Court in
Grutter.”18 And if we take the Fifth Circuit’s view, the black daughter of a
cardiac surgeon will likely lose in a heads-up contest to the white daughter
of a low-income high school dropout, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit writes that permissible consideration
does not define an applicant by race but instead ensures that she is valued
for all her unique attributes. . . . Both Bakke and Gratz firmly rejected
group treatment, insisting that the focus be upon individuals and that an
applicant’s achievements be judged in the context of one’s personal circumstances, of which race is only a part. So deployed, a white applicant
raised by a single parent who did not attend high school and struggled
paycheck to paycheck and a minority child of a successful cardiovascular
surgeon may both claim adversity, but the personal hurdles each has
cleared will not be seen to be of the same height.19

This reading of Gratz and Grutter leads inexorably to the conclusion
that race in and of itself, divorced from correlative social and economic
phenomena, cannot be weighed in an applicant’s favor: for how can we use
race to allocate admissions benefits if we do not define someone to be of a
particular race? Quite simply, if race may be considered only as part of a
holistic person, without regard to balancing members of that race with
members of other races, without reducing individuals to members of that
race, and without giving preference to members of that race over white students from disadvantaged backgrounds, what could “race” possibly do? The
Fifth Circuit’s reading thus writes race out of the admissions calculus.
Considering these cases in light of the Brothers Malone, removal of race
as a consideration may have been the Court’s intention in Gratz and Grutter.
The majorities in these cases wasn’t advocating subterfuge; rather, they
urged that we abandon race in favor of other factors that, in their view, more
closely approximate an index of social disadvantage. In permitting race to
16. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304.
17. 631 F.3d 213, 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2005 WL 2034942 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345)).
18. Id. at 218.
19. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
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be evaluated only in light of the social context in which the applicant was
raised, the Court effectively precluded any admissions advantage from accruing to on the basis of a hard-and-fast determination of her race. The
majorities in Gratz and Grutter avoided the thorny problem Judge Wilkins
faced—they sought to avoid situations in which the government must necessarily decide someone’s race.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
the Court’s most recent pronouncement on race in schools, advances this
reading.20 In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy (the Justice whose vote will
almost certainly determine the ultimate fate of Fisher) expresses concern
with the consequences of racial definitions:
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define
what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite?
To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with
the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label that an individual
is powerless to change.21

So Justice Kennedy naturally proposes a host of methods that a school district may use to increase the racial diversity of its student body, all of them
facially race-neutral but intentionally race-conscious. In Parents Involved,
Justice Kennedy—perhaps inadvertently—explores the consequences of
reading Grutter to preclude race as an admissions factor; as part of his proposed methods, committees must instead decide on the basis of factors that
correlate with race.
A pair of hypotheticals illuminate Justice Kennedy’s position. Imagine
the Brothers Malone had applied to the University of Michigan Law School
in 2002, describing themselves, of course, as black. Let every other aspect
of their application be true. Under the Gratz plan, an admissions officer who
gets wise to the Malones, and the admissions committee that sorts out the
mess, would be forced to define whiteness per se before they can define the
Malones as white. These hypothetical Malones (as the real Brothers did)
will claim that the University asked only for “racial self-identification” and
that this is how they so identify. But the Gratz plan, as the Court briefly and
obliquely notes, involved “a factual review of an application to determine
whether an individual is a member of one of these minority groups.”22 That
this is “the only consideration” accompanying the distribution of points to
members of minority groups troubled the Court and seems to have influenced its negative treatment of the Gratz plan.23 If the admissions committee
was suspicious of the Malones under a Gratz plan, it would have to explain
what happened to the points in their scores and would, therefore, have to
determine and openly declare that they were not, in fact, black.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2003).
Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003).
Id. at 246.
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Under the Grutter plan, however, the courts and admissions officers
wouldn’t have to wade into this mess: rather, they could evaluate the charlatan brothers in light of their overall applications, accepting or rejecting them
without ever declaring their claim to minority status spurious. If the admissions committee smelled something fishy, it could simply reject the
application without any record of a racial determination. The split doubleheader, then, allows schools to have the benefits of diversity without engaging in the unpleasant process of adjudicating race. But it has done so by
eliminating race as a factor divorced from its social context—race as a physical set of traits, at least—from the admissions process.
If we change the hypothetical slightly, we can see the divergence between some of the Justices’ positions in Gratz and Grutter and reveal their
common concern with the definitional problem. Justice Rehnquist was suspicious of the law school’s motives: he believed that the holistic review was
little more than a racial quota masquerading as diversity plan.24 The majorities, on the other hand, believed the law school’s contentions.25 Either way,
as the following hypothetical shows, Grutter avoided racial determinations
while Gratz encouraged them.
Imagine we have two white applicants who, by academic standards
alone, would be at least marginally qualified for admission to the law
school. Were they to fib about their race on their applications, under the
Grutter plan they could be admitted for one of several reasons. In Justice
Rehnquist’s view, the applicants would be admitted because the school was
engaging in thinly-veiled racial balancing—seeing an opportunity to increase minority enrollment without sacrificing other numerical standards,
the law school would, in his view, pounce on the opportunity. But under the
Grutter majority’s view, the applicants might be admitted and might not be,
but only because of their contribution to a diverse student body in ways reflected by their application as a whole—if their story didn’t seem to add up
to a significant contribution to diversity, an admissions officer would likely
reject them.
Under either view of the school’s motives, the Gratz plan would reject
the applicants, assuming the “factual review” reveals their chicane. The
Gratz dissenters, of course, would be fine with this result: in their view, if a
school is going to treat applicants differently by virtue of their race, then it
ought to do so openly and systematically. But as the two contrasting hypotheticals show, regardless of one’s view of the motives of the law school,
and regardless of the status of the applicants involved, Grutter avoids the
pesky definitional problem that a school would face under a Gratz-like plan.
III. Maybe GRUTTER Isn’t So Crazy After All
The program at issue in Fisher uses race as an admissions factor in a
vanishingly minimal manner. After dividing applicants into in- and out-of24.
25.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 379 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 306.
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state groups, the University of Texas assigns each applicant an Academic
Index Score (“AIS”) and a Personal Achievement Score (“PAS”). The latter
is designed to “recognize qualified students whose merit as applicants was
not adequately reflected by their [AIS].” As such, it takes into account “special circumstances that may reflect—beginning in 2004—the applicant’s
race.”26 But, the Fifth Circuit writes, quoting the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the university, that “race is considered as part of the
applicant’s context whether or not the applicant belongs to a minority group,
and so—at least in theory—it ‘can positively impact applicants of all races,
including Caucasian[s], or [it] may have no impact whatsoever.’ ”27 Indeed,
UT does not monitor the aggregate racial composition of the admitted applicant pool during the process [so] the admissions decision for any
particular applicant is not affected by the number of other students of her
racial group who have been admitted during that year . . . [and] UT’s admissions procedures do not treat certain racial groups or minorities
differently when reviewing individual applications.28

Under this plan, it seems very unlikely that race as a factor in and of itself
does much at all. And, in reality, it probably hasn’t done much, at least when
compared to other affirmative action plans. Certainly, the Fifth Circuit
would have us think so.29
The Grutter rule examined in this light may seem hardly different from
a rule forbidding consideration of race and allowing consideration of other
social factors. But it is different. As the experience at the University of
Michigan Law School pre- and post-Proposition Two suggests, the Grutter
rule was doing something: since its demise, black, Hispanic and Native
American enrollment fell 34.1 percent in one year.30 The Grutter rule allows
schools to say that they’re using race so that those schools can continue to
use other relevant social factors of their choosing, factors which often correlate closely with race, without fear of running afoul of constitutional law
and while continuing to select students with other desirable qualifications.
Imagine that Michigan Law wanted to institute a program to increase
enrollment from Detroit, which is overwhelmingly nonwhite.31 Under any
conceivable holding in Gratz and Grutter, it could permissibly do so. But
were it to do so today, Michigan Law would expose itself to criticism that it
is violating Proposition Two—and probably a lawsuit to that effect. As such,
26. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 228 (2011).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 235 (“The percentage of Hispanics at UT is less than two-thirds the percentage of Hispanics in Texas and the percentage of African-Americans at UT is half the
percentage of Texas’s African-American population.”).
30. Elizabeth Redden, Now and Then: Minorities and Michigan, Inside Higher Ed
(June 19, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/06/19/michigan.
31. Detroit (city) QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau (Jan. 31, 2012, 5:15 PM),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (listing Detroit as 7.8 percent white,
non-Hispanic).
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the school would be deterred, at the margin at least, from adopting this kind
of policy. Similarly, were Michigan Law to use race-conscious but facially
race-neutral polices (like those Justice Kennedy advocated in Parents Involved), it would no longer be able to select its students in as nuanced a
manner as it could under Grutter. Forcing it to be ham-handed in this respect would leave the law school without the tools it needs to select
minority students with other desirable characteristics: mainly, LSAT scores.
So Proposition Two, which precisely mimics what a contrary holding in
Grutter would have done, may significantly deter the Law School from pursuing those polices that Justice Kennedy advocated, such as programs propromoting racial diversity through ostensibly geographical preferences.
The Grutter rule, then, is prophylactic. Universities “ ‘occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition,’ with educational autonomy grounded
in the First Amendment,” the Fifth Circuit wrote in Fisher.32 “Academic
freedom . . . includes a university’s selection of its student body.”33 That
freedom certainly contemplates a university’s right to select students of diverse geographic, economic and linguistic backgrounds. Only when it runs
up against the external constitutional norm forbidding disparate treatment on
the basis of race does the university’s right get tricky. But if the Supreme
Court were to forbid a university from considering race, it risks a potentially
enormous chilling effect on the university’s ability to consider other relevant
factors, an ability to which the university has a constitutional right.34
In light of the familiar framework of prophylaxis from First and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Grutter Court might have stumbled upon an
eminently sensible rule, one that avoids the troubling definitional problems
illustrated by the Malones’ case and achieves a diverse student body in a
way that protects a university’s right to choose its students by nonracially
conscious means. Though each of these nonracially conscious means is, of
course, constitutional, the Grutter Court has added a layer of prophylactic
protection such that other forces do not push schools to eschew those means.
This alternative reading of Grutter suggests that the Court ought not to
strike down the University of Texas’s plan, regardless of its view of the constitutionality of race qua race as a factor in admissions. The plan uses race in
the minimally troubling manner of the Grutter plan and certainly, as the
Fifth Circuit noted, does not appear to be a quota by another name. And it
avoids stigmatizing students by forcing them to “live under a state-mandated
racial label.”35 One must then wonder why the Court has granted certiorari
in Fisher. Perhaps the Court is planning to reconsider the notion of critical
mass it detailed in Gutter and rule that the University of Texas has reached
one, suggesting a more active role for the Court in policing the outer boundaries of affirmative action plans. Regardless, it seems very likely that the
32.
33.
34.
35.
(2003).

Fisher, 631 F.3d at 231 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)) .
Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
Id.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797
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Court is planning to overturn Grutter or at least substantially retreat from it.
Before scrapping it though, the Court should consider the full effects of its
decision in Grutter.

